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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Appellee/Plaintiff, 
v. 
RICKY ANGILAU, 
Appellant/Defendant. 
Case No. 20090538 
(INCARCERATED) 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE DIRECT FILE STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
UNDER MOHL 
The State argues as if the direct file statute mandated that prosecutors file 
informations or indictments in adult court in cases involving 16 and 17 year olds charged 
with murder or aggravated murder, and as if prosecutors have no discretion to proceed by 
petition in juvenile court in such cases. See State's brief at 11 ("prosecution commences with 
the mandatory filing of an information in the district court"). See also State's brief at 9, 27-
28, 31-32, 37-38. Neither the direct file statute nor any other provision of law requires 
prosecutors to file informations or indictments, as opposed to juvenile court petitions, in 
such cases. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701(l)(a)1 wkh Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-
!The direct file statute provides in relevant part: 
(1) The district court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all 
persons 16 years of age or older charged by information or indictment with: 
(a) an offense which would be murder or 
1 
702.2 Rather, prosecutors are free to file petitions in cases they deem appropriate.3 
Thus, prosecutors continue to have discretion to charge a child in adult court or 
juvenile court as was found to be unconstitutional in State v. Mohi 901 P.2d 991 (Utah 
1995).4 Compare Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-25(6)(b) (1993) with Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-
aggravated murder if committed by an adult[.] 
2The Serious Youth Offender statute provides in relevant part: 
(1) Any action filed by a county attorney, district attorney, or attorney 
general charging a minor 16 years of age or older with a felony shall be by 
criminal information and filed in the juvenile court if the information charges 
any of the following offenses: ... 
(Emphasis added). 
3Prosecutors may file petitions in the juvenile court under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-
103(l)(a), which provides, in relevant part: 
(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, the juvenile court has exclusive 
original jurisdiction in proceedings concerning: 
(a) a child who has violated any federal, state, or local law or municipal 
ordinance or a person younger than 21 years of age who has violated any law 
or ordinance before becoming 18 years of age, regardless of where the 
violation occurred, excluding offenses in Subsection 78A-7-106(2)[.] 
Section 78A-7-106(2) pertains to traffic and other misdemeanors in the jurisdiction of the 
justice of the peace courts. 
The Court explained the problem with the direct file statute in Mohi which remains in the 
current statutory scheme: 
[T]he present Act treats a certain subclass of juveniles nonuniformly. Juveniles 
against whom indictments or informations are filed are statutorily 
indistinguishable from those who remain in juvenile jurisdiction. By the very 
terms of the statute, they are accused of the same offenses and fall into the 
same age ranges. There is absolutely nothing in the statute to identify the 
juveniles to be tried as adults; it describes no distinctive characteristics to set 
them apart from juveniles in the other statutory class who remain in juvenile 
jurisdiction. However, there are critically important differences in the 
treatment of those juveniles tried as adults compared to those left in the 
juvenile system. 
2 
701. The present direct file statute significantly augments the prosecutors' unconstitutional 
discretion from that in effect at the time of Mohi by removing all judicial review of the 
prosecutor's choice to file in adult court5 
The State argues that the direct file statute grants prosecutors only standard 
prosecutorial discretion to select a charge, and that district courts may "remedy" a 
prosecutor's overcharging an offense to bring a child into adult court by virtue of Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 78A-6-601 and 78A-6-701(3)(b). State's brief at 33. Section 78A-6-601 provides: 
(1) If, during the pendency of a criminal or quasi-criminal proceeding in 
another court, including a preliminary hearing, it is determined that the person 
charged is under 21 years of age and was less than 18 years of age at the time 
of committing the alleged offense, that court shall transfer the case to the 
juvenile court, together with all the papers, documents, and transcripts of any 
testimony except as provided in Sections 78A-6-702 and 78A-6--703. 
(2) The court making the transfer shall order the person to be taken 
immediately to the juvenile court or to a place of detention designated by the 
juvenile court, or shall release him to the custody of his parent or guardian or 
other person legally responsible for him, to be brought before the juvenile 
court at a time designated by it. The juvenile court shall then proceed as 
provided in this chapter. 
Mohi. 901 P.2d at 998. 
5
 Unlike the former statute, the present direct file statute contains no recall provision. 
See. In re N.H.B.. 777 P.2d 487, 490-92 (Utah App. 1989) (upholding direct filing statute 
because, inter alia^ the recall hearings provided the right to counsel, a record of the 
proceedings, a hearing, and appropriate findings); State v. Bell 785 P.2d 390, 402-404 (Utah 
1989) (in upholding direct filing statute, which was contingent on the juvenile court's 
determination that recall to juvenile court was inappropriate, the court recognized, "[0]ur 
decision is supported by the crucial fact that under the statute in question, the juvenile court 
has the right and retains the power in the final regard to 'recall control' over the child and 
bring him or her back into the juvenile system."). 
Nor does the current direct file statute contemplate an appeal of right from the child's 
arrival in the adult system, which appeals are provided as a matter of right for children whose 
cases arrive in adult court through certification from the juvenile court or through a Serious 
Youth Offender bindover order from juvenile court. See Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-704. 
3 
This statute recognizes that direct file children are not properly prosecuted in adult court, 
and should have their cases transferred to juvenile court as soon as an adult court determines 
that they are under 21 at the time of the hearing and were under 18 at the time of the alleged 
offense. It does not stand for the proposition that a district court should assess the evidence 
and determine whether the charge selected by a prosecutor was excessive.6 
The other statute which the State holds out as a remedy to overcharging by 
prosecutors, 78A-6-701(3)(b), provides: 
(b) If the qualifying charge under Subsection (1) results in an acquittal, 
a finding of not guilty, or a dismissal of the charge in the district court, the 
6The State's reliance on §78A-6-601 as a remedy for prosecutorial overcharging of 
offenses appears to conflict with its later argument regarding 78A-6-601, which follows: 
Defendant identifies a new conflict for the first time on appeal. He 
contends that the direct-file statute cannot be reconciled with section 78A-6-
601, which requires that district court judges transfer juvenile cases back to 
the juvenile courts unless they arrive in district court by means of SYO or 
certification statutes. See Br. of Aplt. at 45. Defendant's argument ignores the 
fact that the direct file statute represents a grant of "exclusive original 
jurisdiction" of direct file matters to the district court, thereby leaving no 
conflict. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701(l). 
Section 78A-6-601 applies only to those matters over which juvenile 
court may exercise some jurisdiction, as demonstrated by its express exclusion 
from its terms of only those matters which at some level involve juvenile 
court jurisdiction See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-601(l). Direct-file matters, 
however, have been expressly excepted from juvenile court jurisdiction, and, 
hence, need not be excepted from section 78A-6-601 in order to remain in the 
district court. 
Id- at 43-44 (footnote quoting 78A-6-601(l) omitted). The State's argument in this latter 
regard does not square with the plain language of the direct file statute, which only requires 
children's cases to be filed in adult court if they are charged by indictment or information. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701. Nor does it square with the statutes indicating that such 
cases are to be prosecuted in juvenile court. See Utah Code Ann. § §78A-6-103(l)(a), 78A-6-
116, and 78A-6-601., supra. 
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juvenile court under Section 78A-6-103 and the Division of Juvenile Justice 
Services regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the 
minor. 
In assessing the State's argument, it is important to note that subsection (2) of 78A-6-701 
provides continuing jurisdiction in adult court as long as the child is convicted of a joined or 
lesser offense.7 Thus, a child would remain in the adult system even if the murder or 
aggravated murder charge were wholly unsupported, provided that there were another charge 
in the information or indictment, and/or that there were a lesser offense to a murder charge 
778A-6-701 provides: 
(1) The district court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all 
persons 16 years of age or older charged by information or indictment with: 
(a) an offense which would be murder or aggravated 
murder if committed by an adult; or 
(b) an offense which would be a felony if committed by 
an adult if the minor has been previously committed to a secure 
facility as defined in Section 62A-7-101. This Subsection (l)(b) 
shall not apply if the offense is committed in a secure facility. 
(2) When the district court has exclusive original jurisdiction over a 
minor under this section, it also has exclusive original jurisdiction over the 
minor regarding all offenses joined with the qualifying offense, and any other 
offenses, including misdemeanors, arising from the same criminal episode. The 
district court is not divested of jurisdiction by virtue of the fact that the minor 
is allowed to enter a plea to, or is found guilty of, a lesser or joined offense. 
(3) (a) Any felony, misdemeanor, or infraction committed after the 
offense over which the district court takes jurisdiction under Subsection (1) or 
(2) shall be tried against the defendant as an adult in the district court or justice 
court having jurisdiction. 
(b) If the qualifying charge under Subsection (1) results 
in an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or a dismissal of the 
charge in the district court, the juvenile court under Section 
78A-6-103 and the Division of Juvenile Justice Services regain 
jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the 
minor. 
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to keep the child in adult court. See id. District court judges faced with motions to dismiss 
generally recognize that murder and lesser included offenses turn on the defendant's intent 
and other factual issues that are normally the jury's to decide. See, e.g.. Sandstrom v. 
Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523 (1979) (explaining jury role to assess facts and intent). Also, the 
State's argument does not account for the reality that many children will plead out in adult 
court prior to trial rather than risk facing the full consequences which are attendant to 
prosecution for murder or aggravated murder in adult court. 
Assuming arguendo that a district court judge would dismiss a murder charge based 
on a lack of evidence, and not allow the case to proceed on a lesser or joined offense, this 
would not entirely remedy the harms a juvenile might experience while in the adult system, 
such as being held in the Salt Lake County adult jail illegally for over a year, see, e^g., Angilau 
v. Winder, 20090677. 
Nor would this be a true remedy for the type of prosecutorial discretion permitted by 
the statute. As the Mohi Court explained in distinguishing between the legitimate type of 
prosecutorial discretion and that afforded by the direct file statute: 
The type of discretion incorporated in the Act is unlike traditional 
prosecutor discretion. Selecting a charge to fit the circumstances of a 
defendant and his or her alleged acts is a necessary step in the chain of any 
prosecution. It requires a legal determination on the part of the prosecutor as 
to which elements of an offense can likely be proved at trial. Moreover, such 
discretion is also beneficial to the public; it allows prosecutors to plea-bargain 
with offenders in some cases, saving the public the expense of criminal 
prosecutions. However, none of these benefits accompany the discretion to 
choose which juveniles to prosecute in adult rather than in juvenile court. The 
elements of the offense are determined by the charging decision, and it is only 
the charging decision that is protected by traditional notions of prosecutor 
6 
discretion. Choosing which court to file charges in has significant 
consequences for the offender, and the statute does not indicate what 
characteristics of the offender mandate that choice. The scope for prosecutor 
stereotypes, prejudices, and biases of all kinds is simply too great. If it is the 
legislature's determination to have all members of a certain group of violent 
juveniles (such as repeat offenders, those who use guns, etc.) tried as adults, it 
is free to do so. However, the legislature may not create a scheme which 
permits the random and unsupervised separation of all such violent juveniles 
into a relatively privileged group on the one hand and a relatively burdened 
group on the other. 
Id. at 1002-03 (citations omitted). 
The State argues that Angilau does not claim an abuse of charging discretion by the 
prosecutor. State's brief at 32-33. Angilau has not yet had a preliminary hearing, let alone a 
trial, and thus has no record from which to argue that the murder charge is excessive in this 
case.8 Contrary to the State's position, Angilau has consistently contended that the 
prosecutor's choice to file his case in adult court was erroneously based on her misperception 
that he is a gang participant (e.g. R. 85, 236-37; 
http://www.ksLcom/?sid=5424474&autostart=y&nid= :148.). 
The District Attorney's choice to file Angilau's case in adult court was ostensibly not 
the result of any belief that she had no authority to file the case in juvenile court. See id. 
Rather, and as the State has never contested, the choice was premised in significant part on 
her erroneous perception that Angilau is a gang member. Compare Angilau's opening brief 
The State's brief states the facts as if it were established that Angilau committed the 
offenses charged. See State's brief at 3. As is true of Angilau's opening brief, the State's 
brief relies solely on the probable cause statement in alleging the facts, as there has been no 
preliminary hearing or trial. See State's brief at 3. 
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at 4-5 with State's brief,passim? This case thus presents a stark object lesson on why one 
person, politically elected or not, should not have unguided and unchecked power to 
determine whether a child is prosecuted in adult or juvenile court. 
Regardless of the legitimacy of the motivation for charging Angilau as an adult, and 
regardless of the fact that the legislative goal of addressing violent crimes by juveniles is 
meritorious, the unconstitutional nature of the statute is determinative. As the Court 
explained in rejecting similar arguments in Mohi 
The State argues that the direct-file provision of the Act is reasonably related 
to the statute's stated purpose because there is a legitimate need to try certain 
violent juveniles as adults. We agree with the State's assertion of need but 
observe that the legislature has failed to specify which violent juveniles require 
such treatment, instead delegating that discretion to prosecutors who have no 
guidelines as to how it is to be exercised. Legitimacy of a goal cannot justify an 
arbitrary means. The State asserts that this problem is cured by the fact that 
prosecutors often have legitimate reasons for wanting to leave persons eligible 
for adult prosecution in juvenile court. But the statute does not require the 
prosecutor to have any reason, legitimate or otherwise, to support his or her 
decision of who stays in juvenile jurisdiction and who does not. Legitimacy in 
the purpose of the statute cannot make up for a deficiency in its design. 
Id. 901 P.2d at 998. 
Contrary to inferences which might be drawn from the "background" discussion in 
9Prior to his arrest and incarceration in the adult jail, Angilau was physically active in 
sports, working hard at school, and participated regularly in family, scouting and church 
activities (Kg,, R. 216-233, 545; T. 9/14/2009 at 5). 
Counsel for Angilau sought evidence that Angilau is in a gang through subpoenas to 
the Salt Lake City Police Department and the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Metro Gang Unit 
on May 14, 2009 (R. 421-24), and through a discovery request to the prosecution on May 
20, 2009 (R. 425-28). As of the September 14, 2009 hearing on the motion to release 
Angilau from Pretrial Sendees, no such evidence had been produced (T. 9/14/2009 at 13). 
8 
the State's brief (at pages 9-11), it is not only fourteen and fifteen year old children who may 
be certified to adult court in the event the Court strikes the direct file statute.10 Under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-602(3), sixteen and seventeen year olds charged with murder are 
also subject to certification; it is only the Serious Youth Offender juveniles who are excluded 
from the certification process.11 In the event this Court strikes the direct file statute, children 
10The State's argument in this regard is directly supported by In re A.B.. 936 P.2d 
1091, 1093 (Utah App. 1997). As is discussed herein, A.B, is incorrect in this respect 
n78A-6-602 provides, in full: 
(1) A proceeding in a minor's case is commenced by petition. 
(2) (a) A peace officer or any public official of the state, any county, 
city, or town charged with the enforcement of the laws of the state or local 
jurisdiction shall file a formal referral with the juvenile court within ten days 
of a minor's arrest. If the arrested minor is taken to a detention facility, the 
formal referral shall be filed with the juvenile court within 72 hours, excluding 
weekends and holidays. There shall be no requirement to file a formal referral 
with the juvenile court on an offense that would be a class B misdemeanor or 
less if committed by an adult. 
(b) When the court is informed by a peace officer or 
other person that a minor is or appears to be within the court's 
jurisdiction, the probation department shall make a preliminary 
inquiry to determine whether the interests of the public or of 
the minor require that further action be taken. 
(c) Based on the preliminary inquiry, the court may 
authorize the filing of or request that the county attorney or 
district attorney as provided under Sections 17-18-1 and 17-18-
17 file a petition. In its discretion, the court may, through its 
probation department, enter into a written consent agreement 
with the minor and, if the minor is a child, the minor's parent, 
guardian, or custodian for the nonjudicial adjustment of the 
case if the facts are admitted and establish prima facie 
jurisdiction. Efforts to effect a nonjudicial adjustment may not 
extend for a period of more than 90 days without leave of a 
judge of the court, who may extend the period for an additional 
90 days. 
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(d) The nonjudicial adjustment of a case may include 
conditions agreed upon as part of the nonjudicial closure: 
(i) payment of a financial penalty of not 
more than $250 to the Juvenile Court; 
(ii) payment of victim restitution; 
(iii) satisfactory completion of 
compensatory service; 
(iv) referral to an appropriate provider for 
counseling or treatment; 
(v) attendance at substance abuse 
programs or counseling programs; 
(vi) compliance with specified restrictions 
on activities and associations; and 
(vii) other reasonable actions that are in 
the interest of the child or minor and the 
community. 
(e) Proceedings involving offenses under Section 78A-6-
606 are governed by that section regarding suspension of 
driving privileges. 
(f) A violation of Section 76-10-105 that is subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court shall include a minimum fine 
or penalty of $60 and participation in a court-approved tobacco 
education program, which may include a participation fee. 
(3) Except as provided in Section 78A-6-702, in the case of a minor 14 
years of age or older, the county attorney, district attorney, or attorney general 
may commence an action by filing a criminal information and a motion 
requesting the juvenile court to waive its jurisdiction and certify the minor to 
the district court. 
(4) (a) In cases of violations of wildlife laws, boating laws, class B and 
class C misdemeanors, other infractions or misdemeanors as designated by 
general order of the Board of Juvenile Court Judges, and violations of Section 
76-10-105 subject to the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court, a petition is not 
required and the issuance of a citation as provided in Section "8^-6-603 is 
sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. A preliminary inquiry is not 
required unless requested by the court. 
(b) Any failure to comply with the time deadline on a 
10 
subject to prosecution under the statute might still be certified to adult court in appropriate 
cases wherein due process of law is afforded. 
II. THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE 
RECOGNIZED PURPOSES OF OUR JUVENILE 
COURTS. 
The State repeatedly argues as if Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-102(5) were rewritten in 
1996 to reflect a shift in the purpose of the juvenile courts away from the goal of 
rehabilitation, by emphasizing public safety, individual accountability and appropriate 
sanctions over rehabilitation, reeducation and treatment. State's brief at 34-35, 13, 21.12 By 
reviewing the legislative history, the Court may confirm that the current statute defining 
purposes of our juvenile courts has not been significantly amended in that respect since it 
was enacted in 1988.13 The statutory purposes of our juvenile courts have included a range 
formal referral may not be the basis of dismissing the formal 
referral. 
12The State's argument in this regard is directly supported by In re A.B.. 936 P.2d 
1091, 1098 (Utah App. 1997). As is discussed herein, A.B. is incorrect in this respect. 
13The 1988 version of the statute, then found at 78-3a-l, provided: 
The juvenile court is established as a forum for the resolution of all 
matters properly brought before it, consistent with applicable constitutional 
and statutory requirements of due process. The court has the jurisdiction, 
powers, and duties under this chapter to: 
(1) promote public safety and individual accountability by the 
imposition of appropriate sanctions on persons who have committed acts in 
violation of law; 
(2) where appropriate, order rehabilitation, reeducation, and treatment 
for persons who have committed acts bringing them within the court's 
jurisdiction; 
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of factors accounting for the unique developmental needs of our children, and the need for 
public safety for many years.14 There is nothing in the language of the current or former 
statutes intimating that the purposes served by the juvenile courts are listed in order of 
importance, or indicating that the fundamental overarching purposes of the juvenile courts 
have shifted away from rehabilitation of children in response to violent crimes by juveniles. 
Our law continues to accurately reflect what the State does not contest: our juvenile 
courts are designed to serve the public interest in meeting the special developmental needs of 
children, whose brains and related abilities to think and behave well are physiologically not 
(3) adjudicate matters that relate to abused, neglected, and dependent 
children and to provide care and protection for these children by placement, 
protection, and custody orders; 
(4) adjudicate matters that relate to children who are beyond parental or 
adult control and to establish appropriate authority over these children by 
means of placement and control orders; 
(5) order appropriate measures to promote guidance and control, 
preferably in the child's own home, as an aid in the prevention of future 
unlawful conduct and the development of responsible citizenship; 
(6) remove a child from parental custody only where the minor's safety 
or welfare, or the public safety, may not otherwise be adequately safeguarded; 
and 
(7) consistent with the ends of justice, strive to act in the best interests 
of the children in all cases and attempt to preserve and strengthen family ties 
where possible. 
The 1965 precursor statute, 78-3a-l, indicated: 
It is the purpose of this act to secure for each child coming before the 
juvenile court such care, guidance and control, preferably in his own home, as will 
serve his welfare and the best interests of the state; to preserve and strengthen family 
ties whenever possible; to secure for any child who is removed from his home the 
care, guidance , and discipline required to assist him to develop into a responsible 
citizen, to improve the conditions and home environment responsible for his 
delinquency; and at the same time, to protect the community and its individual 
citizens against juvenile violence and juvenile lawbreaking. To this end this 
act shall be liberally construed. 
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fully developed when they are under the age of eighteen. Compare Angilau's opening brief 
at 6-10 with State's briti passim. 
III. THE DECISION TO PROSECUTE A CHILD IN ADULT 
COURT INVOLVES LIFE AND LIBERTY INTERESTS, 
AND REQUIRES FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS OF DUE 
PROCESS OF LAW. 
The State argues that the legislature has full authority to require children to be 
prosecuted directly in adult court without due process of law, and that it is only when 
children begin in juvenile court and are transferred from juvenile court to adult court that 
due process is required. State's brief at 14-17. 
Assuming the State's argument to be correct, the direct file statute, 78A-6-701, is in 
the Juvenile Court Act under the Part 7, which addresses "transfers of jurisdiction." The 
juvenile court has original jurisdiction over such children and offenses by virtue of Utah 
Code Ann. § §78A-6-103(l)(a),15 78A-6-116,16 and 78A-6-601.17 It is the prosecutor's 
15Prosecutors may file petitions in the juvenile court under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-
103(l)(a), which provides, in relevant part: 
(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, the juvenile court has exclusive 
original jurisdiction in proceedings concerning: 
(a) a child who has violated any federal, state, or local law or municipal 
ordinance or a person younger than 21 years of age who has violated any law 
or ordinance before becoming 18 years of age, regardless of where the 
violation occurred, excluding offenses in Subsection 78A-7-106(2)[.] 
Section 78A-7-106(2) pertains to traffic and other misdemeanors in the jurisdiction of the 
justice of the peace courts. 
16This statute provides in relevant part: 
(1) Except as provided in Sections 78A-6-702 [the Serious Youth Offender 
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choice to file an information or indictment rather than a petition, and not the choice of the 
legislature, which determines whether children are prosecuted in juvenile court or in adult 
court in direct file cases such as Angilau's, and transfers them into the adult system. 
Compare Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701(l)(a)18 with § 78A-6-103(l)(a), supra. 
Statute] and 78A-6-703 [the certification statute], proceedings in a minorfs case 
shall be regarded as a civil proceeding with the court exercising equitable 
powers. 
(3) A minor may not be charged with a crime or convicted in any court except 
as provided in Sections 78A-6-702 [the Serious Youth Offender statute] and 
78A-6-703 [the certification statute], and in cases involving traffic violations. 
When a petition has been filed in the juvenile court, the minor may not later 
be subjected to criminal prosecution based on the same facts except as 
provided in Section 78A-6-702 or 78A-6-703. 
17This statute provides: 
(1) If, during the pendency of a criminal or quasi-criminal proceeding in 
another court, including a preliminary hearing, it is determined that the person 
charged is under 21 years of age and was less than 18 years of age at the time 
of committing the alleged offense, that court shall transfer the case to the 
juvenile court, together with all the papers, documents, and transcripts of any 
testimony except as provided in Sections 78A-6-702 [the Serious Youth 
Offender statute] and 78A-6-703 [the Certification statute]. 
(2) The court making the transfer shall order the person to be taken 
immediately to the juvenile court or to a place of detention designated by the 
juvenile court, or shall release him to the custody of his parent or guardian or 
other person legally responsible for him, to be brought before the juvenile 
court at a time designated by it. The juvenile court shall then proceed as 
provided in this chapter. 
18The direct file statute only requires adult prosecutions if prosecutors opt to file 
charges by information or indictment, rather than petitions. It provides in relevant part: 
(1) The district court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all 
persons 16 years of age or older charged by information or indictment with: 
(a) an offense which would be murder or 
aggravated murder if committed by an adultf.] 
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Assuming that there is no transfer involved in direct file cases, the authorities upon 
which Angilau relies in seeking due process in the decision to prosecute him in adult court do 
not afford due process solely in the context of transfers from juvenile court, as the State 
contends. See State's brief at 14-16. Mohi cites State in re Clatterbuck 700 P.2d 1076, 1078 
(Utah 1985); and Kent v. United States. 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966), in recognizing that due 
process is required when the critical interest of a juvenile's trial forum is at stake. Mohi. 901 
P.2d at 995-96. Mohi was a direct file case, wherein Mohi began in the adult system, and 
which thus involved no formalized "transfer" from juvenile court to adult court, as the State 
uses the term transfer. See id., 901 P.2d at 994. The Court nonetheless recognized the 
critical nature of the forum selection in discussing how due process must be afforded. See 
id. at 994-95. In re N.H.B.. 777 P.2d 487 (Utah App. 1989), was also a direct file case, 
wherein the court of appeals upheld the statutory scheme because the recall provision in 
effect at that time (but since repealed) provided the procedural protections required by Kent. 
See N.H.B.. 777 P.2d at 490-91. In re R.D.S.. 777 P.2d 532 (Utah App. 1989), is also a direct 
file case wherein the court upheld the recall provision on the basis of N.H.B.'s holding. See 
id, 777 P.2d at 534. Thus, due process is required in direct file cases such as Angilau's 
regardless of whether there is a formal or recognized "transfer" of jurisdiction from juvenile 
to adult court. 
The State suggests that case law relied on by Angilau uniformly rejects the notion that 
there is a liberty interest at stake in the selection between juvenile and adult fora. State's brief 
at 16-17. The Kent Court's conclusion that due process was required hinged significantly on 
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the fact that the decision as to which forum the child would be prosecuted in made a 
difference between his potential incarceration in the juvenile system for five years and his 
potential execution in the adult system. Id., 383 U.S. at 557. Thus, Kent is fairly read as 
recognizing that both life and liberty interests may well be at stake in the choice between 
juvenile and adulter* of prosecution. Kent is fairly read as demonstrating that presence or 
absence of life and liberty interests is fairly assessed by considering the ultimate potential 
outcomes in adult and juvenile courts. See id. Similarly, in Mohi, 901 P.2d 991 (Utah 1995), 
this Court considered the disparate sentencing consequences attendant to adult and juvenile 
prosecutions, and found that Mohi had a "'critically important' liberty interest in the 
sentencing phase of his prosecution". Id. at 1003 and n.18 (quoting Clatterbuck 700 P.2d at 
1076,1079 (Utah 1985). But see State's brief at 16 (claiming that the Court rejected "Mohi's 
claim of a liberty interest under the direct-file statute.").19 
Because there are both life and liberty interests at stake in the determination of 
whether a child is prosecuted in adult or juvenile court, e.g.. Mohi and Kent, procedural due 
process must be afforded under Article I § 7 of the Utah Constitution. See e.g.. Christiansen 
v. Harris. 163 P.2d 314, 317 (Utah 1945). But see State's brief at 19. 
While the State expresses dissatisfaction with the state constitutional analysis 
proffered in Angilau's brief, State's brief at 18-22, there are situations in which it is entirely 
19The State's reliance on State v. Bell 784 P.2d 390, 399 (Utah 1989), is curious, given 
the Mohi Court's recognition that the portion of Bell upon which the State relies is a non-
binding plurality decision, and given that the Mohi Court effectively supplanted that portion 
of Bell with more protective state constitutional law. See Mohi. 901 P.2d at 996 n.3. State in 
re Atcheson. 575 P.2d 181 (Utah 1978), does not address liberty interests, but see State's 
brief at 17, but does intimate that children may be prosecuted in adult court anytime. 
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appropriate to simply acknowledge and enforce our state constitutional provisions. See, e.g.. 
State v. DeMille. 756 P.2d 81, 84 (Utah 1988) (holding on the basis of very brief briefing by 
the State that state constitution prohibited inquiry into juror's responses to prayers in post-
trial inquiry because Utah Constitution protects the religious liberties of jurors). Counsel for 
Angilau are seeking a ruling from this Court which is consistent with the Utah and Federal 
Constitutions and the remainder of the Utah Code. Accordingly, it is appropriate to inform 
the Court on the provisions of law which collectively support a ruling striking the direct file 
statute. C £ , e ^ I.M.L. v. State. 2002 UT 110, Tf26, 61 P.3d 1038 (noting basic rules of 
statutory construction requiring courts to interpret related laws in harmonious fashion). 
The State's analysis under the state constitution is wanting because the State fails to 
acknowledge that the direct file statute classifies between those children who will be 
prosecuted by indictment or information in adult court and those who will be adjudicated by 
petition in juvenile court, without providing any rationale or statutory criteria for a 
prosecutor to follow in making the choice. See State's brief at 27-40. The State's tacit 
acknowledgment that any legitimate public interest to be served by the direct file statute is 
already and equally served by the certification statute, State's brief at 37-38, confirms that the 
direct file statute is not necessary to serve any legitimate purpose. 
The State does not mention by name Kclley v. Kaiser, 992 F.2d 1509 (10th Or . 1993), 
which recogni2es that once a state creates a juvenile court system, the federal constitution 
requires a Kent hearing as a constitutional requirement of any adult court prosecution. Id. at 
1515. State's brief passim. The State refers to the opinion obliquely, as if this Court in Mohi 
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were utilizing that opinion solely to warn the legislature against constitutional problems 
which might arise if the legislature attempted to try all children as adults without judicial 
review. State's brief at 18 n.2. Mohi repeatedly draws attention to Kaiser, first citing it to 
question the State's proposition that no direct file statute had been held unconstitutional. 
Mohi. 901 P.2d at 1001 n.14. Mohi does cite Kelley in noting the constitutional concerns 
which would arise if the legislature sought adult treatment of all juveniles without a hearing, 
but also quotes the key language in Kaiser, which the State does not refute: "'Having created 
the juvenile court system, under Kent, it is the State's decision to seek to treat a juvenile as an 
adult that, in and of itself triggers the need for a hearing."' Mohi, 901 P.2d at 1003 n.19, 
quoting Kaiser at 1515. The Court harkened back to note 19 and Kaiser in a footnote to the 
sentence in Mohi indicating that juveniles would have no state due process right to a hearing 
if they had been charged properly as adults, intimating that the Court recognized that the 
proposition as to the lack of a right to a hearing was open to question. See Mohi. 901 P.2d at 
1005 n.24. 
Angilau has presented both state and federal constitutional precedent which the Court 
should consider and upon which the Court should rely in reiterating and giving effect to the 
rationale of Mohi and Kent: 
"[Tjhere is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of such 
tremendous consequences [prosecuting children in the adult system] without 
ceremony-without a hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without a 
statement of reason. It is inconceivable that a court of justice dealing with 
adults would proceed in this manner. It would be extraordinary if society's 
special concern for children ... permitted this procedure. " 
State v. Mohi. 901 P.2d 991, 996 n.2., quoting Kent, 383 U.S. at 554. 
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IV. THE STATE'S EFFORTS TO UPHOLD THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING 
ARE INCORRECT. 
The State's efforts to uphold the trial court's ruling fail to acknowledge that the direct 
file statute does not require prosecutors to file informations in district court, but permits 
them to file petitions in juvenile court. See State's brief at 41 n.8, relying on State's brief at 
33-38. While portions of the floor debates do indicate Senator Hillyard's belief that the 
legislation would eliminate the prosecutorial discretion which concerned the Court in Mohi. 
the floor debates occurred before Mohi was published, and the legislature did not have the 
benefit of the Mohi decision when the direct file statute was amended. The Court normally 
does not rely on floor debates when statutory language is clear, as it is here. See, e ^ , Vigos 
v. Mountainland Builders Inc.. 2000 UT 2, f 13, 993 P.2d 207.20 
The State argues that the trial court did not err in refusing to analyze Angilau's 
constitutional challenges to the direct file statute, because controlling precedents 
demonstrated that as long as the statute did not provide excessive prosecutorial discretion, 
the statute was constitutional. State's brief at 41 n.8. The statute did and still does provide 
excessive prosecutorial discretion, and the state and federal constitutional law relied on by 
Angilau in the trial court provided legitimate authority for the trial court to consider in 
fulfilling its duty to uphold the state and federal constitutions (R. 28-56, 78-405, and R. 
A/6/20W, passim). See, e.g.. Attorney's Oath in the Preamble to the Rules of Professional 
20The floor debates underlying SB 111 are appended to this brief. It remains 
Angilau's position that the plain language of the statutes involved is abundantly clear. 
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Conduct. 
The State does not defend the trial court's literal rewriting of 78A-6-116. Compare 
Angilau's opening brief at 44-46 (discussing the impropriety of a court's inferring substantive 
terms into a statute) with State's brief (describing this aspect of the trial court's ruling as 
"trying to explain" the statute). The State's argument that section 78A-6-116 refers only to 
matters wherein juvenile courts exercise jurisdiction, like the trial court's ruling to the same 
effect, is incorrect. Subsection (3) of the statute provides: 
(3) A minor may not be charged with a crime or convicted in any court except 
as provided in Sections 78A-6-702 and 78A-6-703, and in cases involving 
traffic violations. When a petition has been filed in the juvenile court, the 
minor may not later be subjected to criminal prosecution based on the same 
facts except as provided in Section 78A-6-702 or 78A-6-703. 
Many traffic offenses are actually excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction, and instead often 
lie in the original jurisdiction of the justice of the peace courts, or in district courts when 
there are no justice courts in the municipality where the case arises, if the defendants are 
sixteen years of age or older.22 Thus, 78A-6-116 is not properly read or rewritten as if it 
21A11 members of the Utah State Bar, including the trial court, are bound by the 
attorney's oath: 
I do solemnly swear that I will support, obey and defend the Constitution of the 
United States and the Constitution of Utah; that I will discharge the duties of 
attorney and counselor at law as an officer of the courts of this State with honesty, 
fidelity, professionalism, and civility; and that I will faithfully observe the Rules of 
Professional Conduct and the Standards of Professionalism and Civility promulgated 
by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah. 
22
 The State's representation that juvenile courts share jurisdiction with other courts 
over those traffic offenses over which the juvenile courts have exclusive jurisdiction, State's 
brief at 43, is incorrect. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-7-106 (2) (recognizing justice court 
jurisdiction over many traffic and other misdemeanors committed by those sixteen years of 
age and older); 78A-6-103(l)(a) (excluding cases falling within 78A-7-106(2) from juvenile 
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applied only to cases wherein the juvenile courts have jurisdiction. Rather, it is properly read 
according to its plain language, in reflecting that aside from cases involving certification and 
Serious Youth Offender charges, proceedings involving children are civil and fall within the 
juvenile court's equitable powers. 78A-6-116(l). 78A-6-116(3) is properly given its literal 
interpretation: a minor may not be charged with or convicted of a crime in any court except 
in certification, Serious Youth Offender, and traffic cases. See id. 
In sum, the direct file statute is unconstitutional and does not comport with the 
remainder of the Utah Code. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should strike the direct file statute on constitutional grounds and reverse 
the trial court's order denying the motion to dismiss the information and case from adult 
court. 
court jurisdiction), 78A-5-102(9) (recognizing district court jurisdiction over many traffic, 
offenses committed by those sixteen or older in jurisdictions without justice courts). 
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ADDENDUM 
FLOOR DEBATES ON SBl 11 
SENATE BILL 111 
SERIOUS YOUTH OFFENDER 
SENATE DEBATE 
51ST LEGISLATURE 
GENERAL SESSION 
DAY 25 — FEBRUARY 9, 1995 
TAPE 20 AT 752 
Secretary: 
Mr. President: 
Body: 
Mr. President: 
Body: 
Mr. President: 
Sen. Hillyard: 
Senate Bill 111, Serious Youth Offender, by 
Senator Hillyard and the Committee Report 
February 6, 1995: "Mr. President, the Human 
Services Committee reports a favorable 
recommendation on Senate Bill 111 with 
amendments on pages 7, 8, 9, 13, and 13 . 
Respectfully, Charles Stewart, Acting 
Committee Chair." 
Move we adopt the Committee Report. 
Motion to adopt the Committee Report. All 
those in favor say "aye." 
Aye. 
Are there any opposed? 
(None) 
Seeing no opposition, the bill is before us, 
Senate Bill 111. Senator Hillyard. 
Thank you, Mr. President. I want to direct 
the Senate's attention to the fact that this 
is probably going to be one of the most 
important pieces of legislation that we 
consider this session as it relates to crime, 
and it's a part of a package. It's not the 
sole crime package, but it's part of it. 
The body may also remember a year ago, I 
filed the bill under the same name, quite a 
bit different from this bill. It was Senate 
Bill 249. We had a very interesting debate 
in which I had opposition from a number of 
people in law enforcement because I felt that 
it was doing the proper thing to give more 
power to the juvenile court judges to address 
the serious problems of gang and youth 
violence. 
This body chose to adopt and pass that bill 
unanimously. We realized in passing it, it 
carried a significant fiscal note, but we 
also knew that it would be giving a message 
that we wanted something done in this area. 
And I can report back-- since that action in 
the past year, there has been a tremendous 
amount of work by all the various agencies to 
have come together to bring to you Senate 
Bill 111, which is a serious youth offender 
bill. 
This bill is being supported by a number of 
people including the Governor, the Commission 
on Criminal and Juvenile Justice, Utah 
Sentencing Commission, Utah Substance Abuse 
and Anti-violence Council, Utah Judicial 
Council, juvenile court judges (and I should 
indicate that the juvenile court judges have 
felt left out in the process, now feel very 
much a part of this process in coming to 
grips with this), Board of Youth Corrections, 
Utah Law Enforcement Legislative Committee, 
and many, many others. 
Let me just indicate that the bill does three 
things. Number oner> it provides that if a 
youth 16 or 17 years old is charged with 
aggravated murder or murder, which was 
formerly called first or second degree 
murder, if they're charged with this, they 
will be automatically transferred and treated 
in the adult system. 
One of the issues now pending before the Utah 
Supreme Court involves a young man here in 
Salt Lake City who shot and killed another 
person, I think at the Triad Center. The 
case up on appeal is whether our current 
system is legal, where you can be certified 
or directly filed at the discretion of the 
prosecutor. The issue is whether, how much 
discretion the prosecutor can have. And this 
bill takes away from that, and if the 
prosecutor chooses to charge as first or 
second degree murder, aggravated or murder, 
the young man or young woman is automatically 
treated in the adult system. 
The second place where it automatically goes 
is if that youth has been committed to a 
secure facility. They use the term committed 
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in juvenile court. We would ta lk about 
confinement in a j a i l . But t he committed, 
and then commits a felony, which i s another 
serious offense, then they automatically are 
placed in the adult system. The reason being 
i s the feeling is that if you have been 
committed in the juvenile court system, that 
i s the most severe punishment they can give 
to you. And if that hasn't worked, the 
feeling i s that you now completed the, what 
i s available in the juvenile court system, 
and you wil l now, as the sayxng goes, i f you 
commit an adult crime, y o u ' l l spend adult 
time. 
The t h i r d issue this case c r ea t e s , and a 
thing tha t I really like about i t , i s tha t i t 
l i s t s a number of very serious aggravated 
offenses such as aggravated arson, aggravated 
assaul t , aggravated kidnapping, e t c . If that 
i s committed by a youth 16 o r 17 years of 
age, then there ' s a process s e t up whereby he 
i s ce r t i f i ed over to d i s t r i c t court but can 
be re ta ined by the juvenile c o u r t . So the juvenile court will have a chance to hear 
that in a preliminary hearing type s i tua t ion 
and be able to make-a decision tha t , no, 
there are programs for th is youth that would • 
s t i l l make him amenable to wliat can be done 
in juvenile court and he would be re ta ined. 
I t does away with the direct f i l i n g so the 
court, the prosecutor will no t be able to 
d i rec t ly f i l e any more, but w i l l go through a 
preliminary hearing process i n front of the juvenile court for those youth under the age 
of 16. At our committee hearing, we had an 
argument by the ACLU that t h i s v io la ted 
const i tu t ional r ights. I'm reminded of a 
statement my good friend Senator Chic Bullen 
said, i f you get four lawyer's together 
arguing what is due process, y o u ' l l get six 
different opinions. But I can assure you 
that t h i s b i l l has been examined very 
carefully by lawyers on tha t issue of due 
process and feel satisfied t h a t i t does 
sat isfy the due process requirement. 
Another question came up in committee whether 
we ought to lower that age from 16 to 15. 
The 16 age was taken because there are a 
number of factors that occur at 16, but also 
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in looking at the implementation of this 
bill, the current data would show that, there 
are probably going to be between 50 and 75 
youth that will be impacted by that that have 
just been in place. To lower that age, we 
may come back and want to do that. But this 
time, as we move forward, we think the 
appropriate age is 16 and that's the line 
that we want to draw. 
Again, the message, we hope, and it's a 
tragic part of our society, that there's 
going to be youth who are going to end up in 
the state prison because of their actions. 
But the feeling is that there is mechanisms 
within the adult system that if they really 
don't warrant going to state prison, they can 
be protected; but, on the other hand, many of 
these youths or most of these youths will end 
up in prison anyway, and we may as well get 
them down there and protect society during 
that time period. 
This bill has been included in the Governor's 
budget for funding, has a fiscal note 
obviously with it. But as I've indicated to 
the committee and I'.11 indicate to you, it's 
only a part of the Governor's program. The 
other very important part is to address the 
things that we need to do in prevention. 
Some of the programs in public education the 
Governor's already led into to do and that 
we've done, I think, will impact what we're 
doing. Also, I think this gives a signal 
that will be helpful in the areas of 
prevention. And the other part of the parcel 
will be, sadly enough, construction of more 
prison space or making available. Some of 
these youths, quite frankly, are a severe 
danger not only to themselves but to society 
and should be removed from the streets. 
Mr. President, that is a synopsis of Senate 
Bill ill. Again, has wide and broad base 
support. I think it is an important step for 
this Legislature to take. 
Mr. President: Thank you. Senator Hull. 
Sen, Hull: Thank you. I was in the committee when this 
was heard, and I do have some concern. I am 
supportive of this bill. My concern is the 
age at which they can be certified for the 
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Sen. Hillyard: 
Sen- Hull: 
Sen. Hillyard: 
Sen. Hull: 
Sen. Hillyard: 
Mr. President: 
Sen. Howell: 
district court, which is 16. And it's been 
discussed. 
They can certify below the ag-e of 16. 
That is correct. 
It's automatic at 16. 
It is automatic at 16. And my concern, and 
I've asked this question on several of the 
bills that have come up dealing with juvenile 
justice, why they selected 15, and it's kind 
of a random age, and I've received several 
answers. One that, I guess the best answer 
was that's the age yoti get a license so 
you're more accountable. But there will be 
other bills coming through, and I think I 
will make, try to make an amendment to make 
that lower, and another one dealing with 
confidentiality. But I'm wondering, really 
in our society where these kids are in 
schools, it's drilled into their minds that 
at age Ninth Grade that, as Least as far as 
their academic behaviors are concerned, those 
go in to stone, those credits and all their 
behaviors and that are kept on school records 
for public use for the rest of their lives, 
from Ninth Grade on. And I'm wondering, if 
we ought to not, since that ±s already 
embedded in their minds that they should be 
accountable then, the colleges use the Ninth, 
Tenth and'Eleventh Grades for their 
accountabilities, if not that is the age 
where they ought to be taught in the courts 
to be accountable, too. That's my only 
concern. I am for, supportive of this bill 
as is. 
I appreciate Senator Hull raising that issue. 
And in response to it, in talking to Camille 
Anthony, who is the director of CCDJ, her 
comment was again, in checking back over, 
they wanted to keep it at age 16 to see how 
the thing works out. And if it turns out, 
Senator Hull, I would be more than happy to 
have you sponsor the bill to lower the age. 
Senator Howell. 
Thank you, Mr. President. Maybe we can just 
make a little amendment here to do that 
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little friendly amendment, Camille. How 
would that be? 
Sen. Hillyard: 
Sen. Howell: 
To faint, 
age. 
No. I would resist changing the 
Sen, Hillyard: 
Sen, Howell: 
Sen. Hillyard: 
Sen. Howell: 
Sen. Hillyard: 
Sen. Howell: 
Sen. Hillyard: 
Sen. Howell: 
Senator Hillyard, as you know, I had the bill 
with regards to concealed weapons and minors, 
and that was one that I was very concerned 
about because on a daily basis, we see, not 
on a daily basis but quite often, we see 
young people who are carrying concealed 
weapons walking up and down Main Street and 
so on and so forth. How would that, how 
would your bill deal with those offenders? 
We clarify a conflict in the law currently. 
There's a conflict in the law because 
prosecutors can tell you that, they can 
directly file on anyone directly in an adult 
court. 
Right. 
That' s what they did in the case of the West 
High student. 
Right. 
The juvenile court judges will tell you, in 
reading the law, they can't do that and they 
can bring them back. Now we resolve that 
issue. They can no longer directly file. 
What's going^tQ happen, if you're 16 or 
older, one of these crimes, then you'll go 
directly to an adult system. If you're under 
age 16, you will then file in juvenile court 
but request the juvenile court certify the 
youth over. So you could have a 14 year old 
who could be, in fact, certified over and 
treated as an adult, but the juvenile court 
would have a preliminary hearing to decide 
whether that transfer ought to be made. 
So the juvenile justice then would make the 
recommendation to bind them over as an adult? 
That's correct. 
Okay. Are we confident, and I guess this 
gets back to the age factor, are we confident 
that in those cases that they'll do it? Like 
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Sen. Hillyard: 
Sen. Howell: 
when there' s a 14 year old who has been 
involved in a felony, let's say? I mean, how 
do I get warm fuzzies that they're going to 
make this deci'sion about turning them over? 
I mean, that's my concern, is that kid, 
individual, who sees no future but they're 
willing to shoot someone. 
Well, let me tell you the problem we had last 
year and what got the opposition to my bill 
was the frustration of juvenile court judges 
that they would get a young man or young 
woman and say, "You're going to spend eight 
months in a secure facility," walk out of the 
court, and youth correction would say, "We 
don't have the room for you, you're out of 
here." It was a joke. And so what we've 
really done is now given the juvenile court 
more play in what they're going to do. 
Okay. And that, that's the very situation is 
to say, "We're filled up, sorry you've 
committed this terrible heinous crime, but we 
can't take any more." So I think that, if 
what you're saying is now they have an 
alternative to say, "You're certified as an 
adult," or, a 16 year old, "You're out of 
here." Great I 
Sen. Hillyard: 
Sen. Howell: 
Mr, President; 
And that's correct. And that's part of th£ 
package. I mean, to do this bill alone 
without the prevention, without more bed 
space, would be a mockery to the system and, 
I think, a fraud on the people of the state 
of Utah. We're doing all thrree of them. 
Mr. President, I withdrew my senate bill with 
regards to juveniles and possession of guns 
for this very reason. And tliis satisfies all 
the requirements that I had in that bill, so 
I commend Senator Hillyard for doing a great 
job on this. 
Thank you, Senator Howell. Senator Hillyard. 
Are there any further questions of Senator 
Hillyard? Senator Hillyard, would you like 
to sum up. Oh, excuse me, Senator 
McAllister. 
Sen. McAllister; Senator Hillyard, I have a concern with 
regard to the fiscal note that's on page 21. 
And you show there the first full year costs, 
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Sen, Hillyard: 
Sen. McAllister: 
Sen. Hillyard: 
Sen. McAllister: 
Sen. Hillyard: 
Sen. McAllister: 
Sen. Hillyard: 
Sen. McAllister: 
Sen. Hil lyard: 
Now those figures, now if I understand 
correct ly, you expect that the re would be 2 
murders within tha t f i r s t f u l l year, 15 f i r s t 
degree, and so on, i s that cor rec t? 
I ' d have to , I ' d have to go t o Camille, who 
has put th is in . 
Is that a proper assumption? 
Yes. 
Well, the concern I have then, if you look 10 
years from now, you're expecting 9 times more 
murders, over 10, probably 12 times more 
first degree, probably 3-1/2 times more 
felonies, and so on. Do you really feel that 
in 10 years, we're going to be living in an 
environment, in a society where such crimes, 
or is it just population? I'm really 
overwhelmed with that kind of statistics. 
I understand. It's a cumulative buildup type 
thing in the system. But, again, I can have 
somebody address that fiscal note directly if 
you want. But my understanding is, is that 
the 18 reflects a buildup of over those time 
periods. 
I see then. It says 10th year, and there's 
nothing to indicate accumulative on that. 
Are you saying then that the fiscal note for 
the first year would be $1,33 8,000, but 
because we're dealing with a part of a year, 
it's $351,800? 
That's correct. 
But in the 10th year, we're not looking at 
$8,000,000 in that year alone (but that's in 
a sense what it says), but you're saying, 
then if the first year is $1,338,000, it 
ought to be something like 10 times that in 
the 10th year, and it isn't. 
I would have to have Leo, who prepared the 
fiscal note, as you know, he doesn't go just 
directly on what somebody tells him, he put 
some things together. I'd be glad to answer 
it on the third reading. 
Sen. McAllister: I think that's fine, but I'd Ixke an answer 
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on that, if you would, please , on the third. 
Sen. Hillyard: 
Mr. President: 
Sen. Hillyard: 
I'll get that information. 
Any further questions of Senator Hillyard? 
Mr. President* 
Mr. President, before I sum up, personal 
pr ivi lege, I have an unrelated matter. 
Mr. President; 
Mr. President, in summation, I think that 
we've pointed out very well this is a bill 
that's been worked on very hard by a number 
of people. I am fortunate enough to be just 
merely a spokesman to represent hundreds of 
hours that have been put on this problem. We 
realize this is not going to solve the 
problem, it's a combination of other things 
that need to be put together. But I think 
it's an excellent beginning, and I would urge 
the support of• this body, and I'd call for a 
question on the bill. 
Thank you, Senator -Hillyard. 
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Reading Clerk: 
Mr. Speaker: 
Rep. Pox: 
Senate Bill 111, Serious Youth Offender, by 
Lyle W. Hillyard. Committee vote: 9 yes, 
0 no, 3 absent. 
Representative Fox. 
Yes, thank you, Mr. Speaker. Before I begin, 
1 would like to move the amendments that have 
been passed out under my name for Senate 
Bill ill. Perhaps we ought to check and make 
sure the body has those. Just been passed 
out, just recently. 
9 
Mr, Speaker: Those who do not have the amendments of 
Senate Bill 111, raise your hand so we can 
see. The circle does not, maybe we ought to 
circle and go on for a minute. 
Rep. Pox: That will be just fine while the 
pages . . . . 
Mr. Speaker: I have a motion to circle Senate Bill 111. 
Discussion that motion. Saying that, all in 
favor say "aye." 
Body: Aye. 
Mr. Speaker: Opposed "no." 
Body: (None) 
Mr. Speaker: The motion carries. The bill is circled. 
Madam Reading Clerk. 
Rep. Fox: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I would move that we 
uncircle Senate Bill 111. 
Mr. Speaker: We have a motion to,-remove the circle from 
Senate Bill 111. Would you state the title. 
Rep. Fox: Yes, Serious Youth Offender. 
Mr. Speaker: Discussion of the motion to uncircle. Seeing 
none, all in favor say "aye." 
Body: Aye. 
Mr. Speaker: Opposed "no. " 
Body: (None) 
Mr. Speaker: The motion carries. The bill is, uncircled. 
You may proceed. 
Rep. Fox: Yes, thank you. I think everyone now has the 
amendments that were just passed out, I 
would like to move those amendments on page 
19, line 21 and after 1, delete "proceedings" 
and insert " except as provided in section 
78-3a-25 and 78-3a-25.1 proceedings" and page 
19, line 29, after "violations" insert 
"criminal proceedings under section 78-3a-25 
and 78-3a-25.1 or to establish the 
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Mr. Speaker: 
Body: 
Mr. Speaker: 
Body: 
Mr. Speaker\ 
Rep. Fox: 
jurisdiction of the court under section 78-
3a-16(l).lf Now, what that does is currently 
our code states that juvenile court evidence 
may not be used any place else other than the 
juvenile court. To effect the provisions of 
SB111, Serious Youth Offender, we need to 
exempt the crimes committed that would fall 
under this bill. So we wanted to, we have to 
make that exemption in the current code. 
The motion is that we accept the pink sheet 
amendment under Representative Fox's name 
dated February 23, 1995 at 5:08 p.m. 
Discussion of the motion to amend. Seeing 
none, all those in favor of the motion to 
amend say "aye." 
Aye. 
Opposed "no." 
(None) 
The motion carries, 
You may proceed. 
The bill is amended. 
Thank you, Mr. Speaker. Unfortunately, Utah 
has seen a tremendous expansion of our young 
people who are committing serious crimes --
murder, all sorts of drive-by shootings. ..We 
see all these things happening. Frankly, 
we're at a loss to how to deal with these 
young criminals. They are still under age, 
but they are hardened criminals nonetheless. 
The serious youth offender bill is the 
product of a year-long effort from Utah's 
criminal and juvenile justice professionals 
to create a new category of crime that will 
safeguard the public and hold violent and 
chronic juvenile offenders accountable. What 
it does is it makes it so the district court 
has exclusive original jurisdiction over 
juveniles age 16 and older charged with 
aggravated murder, murder and any felony 
committed subsequent to confinement in the 
most secure youth offender facilities. 
Juveniles age 16 years and older who commit 
one of the other ten serious offenses against 
a person will be charged with adult crimes. 
The preliminary hearing is held in the 
juvenile court. If the juvenile court judge 
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Mr. Speaker: 
Rep. Bresnahan: 
Rep. Fox: 
Rep. Bresnahan: 
Rep. Fox: 
Rep. Bresnahan: 
Rep. Fox: 
Rep• Bresnahan: 
Rep - Fox: 
Rep. Bresnahan: 
finds probable cause, the burden will shift 
to the defendant to show that he or she 
should remain in the juvenile court. And 
unless the defendant fits some stringent 
criteria, he or she will go directly to trial 
as an adult in the district court. Juveniles 
who do not meet the serious youth offender 
criteria may still be tried as adults in 
district court under the current 
certification process. For consistency, 
those cases will also have preliminary 
hearings in the juvenile court. I am glad to 
answer questions. 
Representative Bresnahan. 
Thank you, Mr. Speaker. Will the sponsor 
yield? 
Yes. 
I have a question regarding the section 
beginning on page 6 and 7 regarding a felony 
committ-ed by a juvenile age 1.4 or older. And 
if you wouldn't mind, I'd like to understand 
the difference between what was said earlier 
in the bill about 16 and older and this 
section regarding 14 and older. 
Under current law, the burden of proof is on 
the State to show why they shouldn't. This 
new change, it would shift that burden to the 
defendant to prove why they should be judged 
as a juvenile. 
So, this--
As an adult, I'm sorry. 
This makes it easier for us to certify some 
of these offenders as adults? Is that my 
understanding? Is that correct? 
Yes. 
That's the only question I have. I'd like to 
say that I do support this bill very 
heartily. It is needed. I have been, I've 
taken the time to tour our juvenile 
facilities. I've gone through every step of 
the way that a juvenile could go through 
those facilities at all the different levels. 
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And I've had opportunity not only to 
interview the staff at those facilities but 
many of the juveniles involved there as well 
as some of their parents. It is quite clear 
to me that we are dealing with a large 
portion of the juvenile population who are 
not only violent offenders but they are 
repeat violent offenders. 
And after having an opportunity to first-hand 
see them and to gain some understanding of 
their circumstances and the various things 
that are happening in their lives, I think 
the greatest service that we can do for .them 
is to intercede as early as possible in the 
chain of events that lead them down a life-
long road of violence and constantly 
requiring incarceration by our society. 
Hopefully, by taking action early, by being 
strong early and getting tough early, we're 
going to prevent the continual repeat 
offenses that seem to take place over and 
over again, where we're hearing stories 
almost daily of youths that have been through 
this system time, and time again, go back out 
into society, and continue to cause greater 
harm and greater injury to others, create 
more crime. And not only do they do get 
involved in it, but they're bringing others 
along with them. I believe that the only-way 
that we're going to be able to see a decrease 
is to get tougher, particularly on the youth 
offenders, and I think this is an excellent, 
excellent bill and it's worthy of all our 
support. Thank you. 
Mr. Speaker: Representative Barth. 
Rep. Barth: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. Let me start off by 
saying this is a good bill. There's a lot of 
thought and energy that have gone into this 
bill. This bill is a couple of things, 
though. It's not a cure-all. Anybody who 
thinks that this bill is going to take all of 
these serious youth offenders off the streets 
and we're going to be rid of that problem is 
mistaken, but it goes a long ways in doing 
that. It's not the last step in fixing a 
system that is antiquated that we need to 
take, but it is a significant and important 
step. This is going to take some kids off 
the street and put them into the adult system 
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faster than if we don't pass this bill. This 
bill will get them off the streets two years 
earlier. 
We're talking about 16 year olds that are 
going to get to the adult system eventually. 
They're continuing their behavior. They've 
had their one shot at the juvenile system. 
They're going to get into the adult system. 
We need to be mindful of a couple things, 
though. The kid needs a one-stop good shot 
at the juvenile system and the resources that 
are there. 
Some people have said the average stay for a 
juvenile in the juvenile facility is eight 
months. That's true. But you're lumping in 
there children that have been in there for 
years, putting that into the average, take 
the top 10% out and the bottom 10% out; the 
average stay is about three months. That's a 
beds problem. This addresses a different 
problem, and we need to address that beds 
problem as well, and we are in this 
Legislature to some degree. 
We're not throwing kids away after this. The 
kids have had a one-shot at the juvenile 
system, and we need to start getting tough 
with them. We need to let them know that 
their behavior is unacceptable, and they need 
to change if they're going to be allowed out 
in society. I would urge you to vote for 
this bill heartily, but do it mindfully that 
this is not the last step in fixing the 
juvenile justice problem that we've got in 
the state of Utah. This is not going to 
decrease gangs sufficiently that we can stop, 
rest on our laurels and quit. But it is a -
significant and worthwhile first step. 
Mr. Speaker: 
Rep. Johnson: 
Mr. Speaker: 
Body: 
Mr. Speaker: 
Representative M_ Johnson. 
I move p rev ious Thank you, Mr. Speaker 
ques t ion , p l e a s e . 
Previous quest ion has been c a l l e d . A l l in 
favor of the previous ques t ion say "aye . " 
Aye. 
Opposed "no." 
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Body: (None) 
Mr. Speaker: The motion carries. Back to sponsor for 
summation. 
Rep. Fox: I think it's all been said. I urge your 
support. Please vote for the bill. 
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